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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Defendants/Respondents Riverland Excavating, Inc., Employer, and State Insurance 
Fund, Surety (collectively hereinafter referred to as "Riverland" or "SIF"), agree with 
paragraphs i and ii of Claimant/ Appellant's Chet Davidson ("Claimant") Statement of the Case 
except that the Commission did not specifically refuse to retain jurisdiction as retention of 
jurisdiction was never raised as an issue by Claimant nor heard by the Industrial Commission 
("Commission") below. The remainder of Claimant's Statement of the Case (iii) is Claimant's 
statement of facts, which were disputed in part in the proceeding below. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
Claimant on April 27, 2006, requested the Commission calendar for hearing the issues of: 
(1) whether Claimant is totally and permanent disabled; (2) apportionment; (3) impairment and 
disability; and (4) attorney's fees. R., p. 34. The matter was heard on November 1, 2006, by the 
Commission Referee Rinda Just ("Referee") in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. On August 17, 2007, the 
Referee submitted her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law· and Recommendation to the 
Commission. R., p. 75. 
On September 7, 2007, the Commission entered an Order approving and adopting the 
Referee's proposed findings of fact, and conclusions oflaw and ordered that: 
l. Claimant is entitled to whole person impairment of 19% for his injuries arising 
from the 1999 accident. The Surety has already paid Claimant impairment benefits totaling 20% 
of whole person; 
2. Claimant has not sustained any disability in excess of his 19% impairment as a 
result of the 1999 accident; 
3. Claimant failed to prove he is totally and permanently disabled; and 
4. Claimant is not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. R., 
, pp. 76-77. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The Commission made the following findings of fact: 
1. At the time of hearing, Claimant was 55 years of age. Twice divorced, with one 
child, he resided in Post Falls, Idaho, with his partner, Paula Smith. 
2. Claimant graduated from high school in 1967 in Wyoming. He has no other 
formal training. 
3. Claimant's spotty work history is limited to the professional rodeo circuit and 
heavy construction. Until about 1983, his income reflects both construction work and rodeo 
prize money. Social Security records1 show that Claimant's earnings were minimal from 1967 
through 1978. During that twelve-year period, he earned just $34,660, less than $3,000 per year. 
From I 979 through 1982 Claimant operated his own trucking company. Claimant testified that 
the trucking business "was working pretty good until the divorce hit me in the face." Tr., p. 23. 
Social Security records for the period show that Claimant's earnings were $12,296, with no 
earnings reported in 1980 or 1982. In 1983, Claimant went to Alaska, where he worked off and 
on in heavy construction for about five years. Claimant testified that he worked for Whitestone 
Logging in 1984, 1985 and 1986 in Alaska. His earnings from 1983 through 1987 were only 
$11,237 with no income reported for 1984, 1985 and 1986. In 1987, Claimant worked for South 
Coast Construction building a road into a mine site in Alaska. Social security earnings for 1987 
were $9,724. 
4. In I 988, Claimant left Alaska and went to work for Northwest Monoroof on a 
construction project on the dam in The Dalles, Oregon. Claimant sustained a cervical injury in 
July 1988, spawning a workers' compensation claim in Washington state that was initially 
denied and was not finally resolved until 1997. Claimant had no reported income for the years 
1989 through 1995. In 1996, he reported income of$500, and Claimant reported no income in 
1997. In 1998, social security reported income of $1,222. Claimant testified that once his 
Washington workers' compensation claim was resolved, he was either working for himself or 
working under the table for his friend, James Nirk. 
I Claimant's social security earnings records are the only reliable indication of Claimant's work history. Claimant's 
statements as to his employment prior to going to work for Employer are inconsistent with the social security 
records, and Claimant's assertions that he worked "under the table" are disputed and cannot be verified. 
5. In July 1999, Claimant went to work for Employer as a heavy equipment operator 
and mechanic helper. In November of that year, Claimant was replacing a chair in a Case loader, 
when the chair slipped and hit him on the head, resulting in a cervical injury. 
6. Claimant sustained a lumbar injury as the result of a motor vehicle accident in the 
early 1970s. Claimant ultimately underwent a fusion somewhere in the vicinity of 13, L4 and 
LS. After recovering, Claimant returned to work and to the rodeo circuit. Approximately two 
years later a bucking horse fell on top of Claimant, re-injuring his lumbar spine and 
necessitating a second lumbar surgery. Then, in about 1976, while punching in a mine road, 
Claimant was thrown off his scraper and injured his low back once again. Although work-
related, the injury was not filed as a workers' compensation claim because it fell under the 
jurisdiction of the mine workers' union. Claimant returned to work operating heavy equipment 
following his recovery from his third low back surgery. Asked if the series oflow back 
surgeries slowed him down, Claimant stated, "[r]un them just as hard and fast as they go." Tr., 
p. 27. 
7. Claimant sustained an injury to his left knee in the mid-1970s when a bull he was 
preparing to ride acted up in the chute, banging Claimant's knee against the metal chute. 
Claimant's kneecap was tom off and he splintered a bone in his left leg. Claimant sustained an 
injury to his right knee as a result of a logging accident in Alaska in the mid-1980s when he was 
helping a friend set choke chain. Following surgery on his right knee, Claimant returned to 
operating heavy equipment. 
8. Claimant testified that he abused alcohol in the 1980s and 1990s: 
Q. [by Verbillis] did you -- during the 80s and 90s, did you have a problem with 
alcohol? 
A. I drank an ocean full of it. 
Q. When did you take the cure? 
A. I've been sober for five and a half years. 
Q. During the time when you were cowboying and working construction, would 
you characterize that you were an alcoholic? 
A. No, [just liked to drink. 
Q. Okay. Denial is one of the signs, partner. 
Tr., pp. 36-37. 
9. Claimant has also had multiple right shoulder separations without medical 
intervention, and has had his cheekbones, jaw and nose broken. Claimant also related that he 
had sustained fractures of his wrist, foot, and shin, all as a result of his years on the rodeo 
circuit. 
I 0. Claimant filed a claim for an injury to his neck and upper back that he alleged 
occurred in 1988 while working on The Dalles Dam for Northwest Monoroof. The claim was 
initially denied based on statements provided by co-workers that Claimant injured himself while 
fishing in the Columbia River. Eventually the surety accepted the claim, although the employer 
contended to the bitter end that Claimant's injury was not work-related. As a result of the July 
1988 injury, Claimant underwent an anterior cervical discectomy at C5-6 in March 1990. 
Dr. Vincent, a Spokane neurosurgeon, performed the surgery. Dr. Vincent testified in his 
deposition that it was his standard practice to perform discectomies only in most such cases 
because in the vast majority of patients a discectomy will progress to a natural fusion of the 
discs over a period of twelve to eighteen months. In fact, Claimant did have a natural fusion at 
that level. 
11. Claimant had on-going pain complaints following the 1990 surgery, and 
contended that he could not return to work. Claimant's workers' compensation file from 
Washington is just shy of 1000 pages (See, Defendants' Ex. 4). Included in the file are 
numerous medical records documenting Claimant's continued complaints without objective 
medical findings to support them. Claimant was offered a great deal ofrehabilitative treatment, 
both medically and vocationally. He was diagnosed with chronic pain syndrome and referred to 
a pain clinic, but he was uncooperative and left the program after only a few days. He was 
offered vocational assistance but consistently insisted that he was unemployable and just wanted 
a settlement. 
12. Claimant's Washington workers' compensation case was ultimately closed in 
1993. He received a whole person impairment rating of 10% for his cervical injury and 25% 
whole person impairment for mental impairment.' 
2 As part of the closing medical evaluation, Claimant was seen by Arthur A. Murray, M.D., a psychiatrist. 
Dr. Murray diagnosed major depression, single episode without psychosis, and somatoform pain disorder related to 
the 1988 injury. He also gave Claimant a diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified. Dr. Murray 
suggested that Claimant receive treatment for the depression, noting that"[ e ]ffective treatment may well lead to 
restoration of productive work on a more or less continuous basis." Defendants' Ex. 4, p. 785. Claimant rejected 
such treatment. 
13. Claimant attempted to reopen the Washington workers' compensation proceeding 
in 1994 asserting that bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome, bilateral adhesive capsulitis and 
bilateral brachia! plexus lesions were a worsening of his cervical condition. The matter was 
ultimately settled, and the Board ofindustrial Insurance Appeal, State of Washington, issued an 
order on August 8, 1997, finding that Claimant was capable of obtaining and performing gainful 
employment from May 3, 1995, through August 1996, and that Claimant's cervical spine injury 
was fixed and stable as of August 5, 1996. Claimant was awarded additional impairment for his 
cervical spine so that his cervical impairment totaled 25% whole person. 
14. In November 1999, Claimant was assisting the mechanic on a repair of the 
hydraulic system on a Case loader. The mechanic was called away, and Claimant was left to 
complete the reassembly of the cab of the loader. The weather was inclement, and Claimant 
wanted to get the seat back into the cab and out of the weather. As he lifted the seat overhead to 
put it in the cab, the seat slipped from his hands and hit his head, bending his neck and knocking 
him to the ground. Claimant finished work that day and continued to work until December 30, 
when Employer shut down for the winter. Claimant reported the injury several days later and 
was referred to the immediate care center in Post Falls. Claimant was seen at the clinic two or 
three times but received no real medical work-up. Eventually, he was referred to physical 
therapy, but the therapist would not see him because he had not had any imaging. The physical 
therapist referred Claimant to Jeffrey D. McDonald, M.D., who saw Claimant on February 4, 
2000. 
15. Dr. McDonald ordered x-rays and an MRI. Based on the results of the imaging 
and his examination of Claimant, Dr. McDonald diagnosed a left sided disc herniation at C6-7, 
neural foraminal narrowing at C5-6, and a severe kyphosis at C5-6. Dr. McDonald 
recommended a three-level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C4-5 and C6-7 with 
internal fixation. Surgery was scheduled, but Claimant's claim was denied and the surgery was 
cancelled. 
16. Surety reversed its denial of the claim in March 2000 and forwarded Claimant's 
medical records to John W. Swartley, M.D., Surety's in-house physician. Dr. Swartley initially 
recommended that Surety authorize the surgery, but several months later changed his opinion 
and recommended that Claimant's case be sent for a panel review. Barbara G. Jessen, M.D., a 
neurologist, and Scott V. Linder, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, conducted an independent 
medical evaluation (IME) of Claimant on June 29, 2000. Their reports are dated the same day. 
17. Dr. Jessens report includes a comprehensive review of Claimant's prior medical 
records, particularly those records pertaining to his lengthy and contentious Washington 
workers' compensation claim. Based on her examination, patient history, and review of the 
medical records, Dr. Jessen opined that it was difficult to ascertain what injury Claimant 
sustained as a result of his November 1999 accident. Claimant did exhibit loss ofleft biceps and 
brachioradiaJis reflexes, but diagnostic studies did not show significant nerve root impingement. 
Dr. Jessen stated that Claimant's condition was only partly due to the 1999 accident, as 
Claimant had a preexisting discectomy at C5-6 in addition to significant preexisting 
degenerative changes. With regard to his preexisting conditions, Dr. Jessen noted: 
[Claimant] is a very angry man, and review of the records reveals he had 
significant pain behavior with apparent symptom magnification following his 
previous claim. He did not discuss the amount of care he had after his surgery 
and implied to me that he got an excellent outcome immediately and was 
asymptomatic subsequently. His history is inconsistent with what is in the 
medical records. 
Defendants' Ex. 7, p. 1038. Dr. Jessen went on to state: 
It is questionable whether further curative measures are available. As a 
neurologist, I am concerned about a three-level fusion, additionally in a man who 
is a 3-pack a day smoker. It is unlikely he will sustain the type of benefit that he 
appears to believe he will by further surgery on his spine of whatever degree, but 
particularly a three-level fusion is problematic in people with the best surgical 
indications. 
Id., at pp. I 038-1039. Dr. Jessen did recommend that Claimant have some further studies, 
including an EMG, nerve conduction studies, and a CT myelogram to identify whether Claimant 
had objective findings of a treatable condition. 
! 8. Dr. Linder was unable to examine Claimant because the doctor required that any 
recording of the actual examination be by video. Dr. Linder's review was limited to a review of 
Claimant's medical records. Based on that review, Dr. Linder expressed reservations about the 
proposed surgery in light of Claimant's smoking habit, the uncertainty of the cause of 
Claimant's complaints, and the limited success rate (40% to 60%) for three-level fusions. 
Dr. Linder opined that a three-level fusion would be justified "only with the clearest of 
indications." Id., at p. 1043. Dr. Linder agreed that additional diagnostic studies should be 
done. 
19. Nerve conduction studies were performed on Claimant on August 7, and were 
entirely normal. Drs. Linder and Jessen opined in an August 11 letter: 
We would thus feel that the odds of surgery successfully alleviating the patient's 
complaints are extremely tenuous for reasons which include, A) a lack of 
neurologic findings on physical examination or on electrical studies, B) the 
presence of well documented significant pain behavior and symptom 
magnification historically, C) inconsistency between the patient's statements and 
medical records, D) his three pack per day smoking habit, E) the rather marginal 
success of three-level cervical fusions under even ideal circumstances. 
Jeanne Kelsch Depo., Exhibit 2, p. 24. Drs. Linder and Jessen concluded that Claimant was 
medically stable and placed him in DRE Category 2 of the AMA Guide// to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment, Fourth Ed., (AMA Guides, 4th Ed.) and rated him at 5% whole person 
impairment based upon the permanent aggravation of his preexisting degenerative cervical 
condition. 
20. Surety forwarded both the June 29 IME report and the panels August 11 letter to 
Dr. McDonald in mid-August. Dr. McDonald responded to the panel report in November. He 
expressed concern or disagreement with portions of the IME report. Drs. Jessen and Linder 
each responded to Dr. McDonald's concerns in January. Dr. Linder noted that the concerns he 
and Dr. Jessen expressed were not absolute contraindications to proceeding with the surgery, but 
did "represent legitimate and sincere concerns over the decision to proceed .. ," Defendants' 
Ex. 7, p. 1015. Dr. Jessen took Dr. McDonald's concerns and Dr. Linder's response as an 
opportunity to review the entire file. She stated that the review "reinforces my initial opinion 
rather than changing it." Id., at p. 1013. 
21. In March 2001, Surety reversed its position and authorized the three-level fusion 
recommended by Dr. McDonald. Surety's change of position regarding surgery was not based 
on medical factors. 
22. Claimant returned to Dr. McDonald on April 30, 2001. Additional imaging was 
obtained and Claimant was scheduled for surgery. Claimant was incarcerated at the time of the 
surgery, and it was rescheduled for August 15, 2001. 
23. Post-fusion, Claimant continued to complain of neck pain and loss of range of 
motion. On February 15, 2002 (five months after surgery), Dr. McDonald made the following 
chart entry: 
At this point [Claimant] is not of the opinion that he will be able to return to work 
at this time. I have asked him to continue all effort at returning to work, however, 
and for the next month we will pursue a physical therapy program for his neck to 
meet these ends. I will see [Claimant] in follow-up after that course of physical 
therapy. At that time I anticipate recommending an independent medical 
evaluation, and a return to work at a minimum at light-duty assignment. 
Defendants' Ex. 2, p. 74. By late April 2002, Claimant was not improved despite several 
months of physical therapy. 
He remains convinced that he is unable to return to work, even at a light-duty 
assignment. He continues to have symptoms consisting primarily of low posterior 
cervical pain, radiating to the interscapular region. 
Id., at p. 66. Dr. McDonald went on to note that Claimant's CT scan showed no evidence of 
neural el_ement compression and the central canal as well as the neural foramina were widely 
patent at each level. Dr. McDonald asked Claimant to continue physical therapy, and suggested 
he might try trigger point injections for his persistent low posterior cervical pain. Dr. McDonald 
also recommended that Claimant undergo a functional capacities evaluation and an IME. 
Claimant was to return in three months for x-rays to determine if he had a solid fusion at C6-7. 
24. On June 8, Dr. Jessen and Charles J. Larson, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, 
conducted an IME of Claimant. At the time of the IME, Claimant was markedly symptomatic, 
reporting pain at the base of his neck and radiating into his left arm and the second, third, and 
fourth digits of his left hand. Claimant stated that the pain he experienced was "exactly the 
same today as it was before he went in for surgery." Defendants' Ex. 7, p. 1003. Based on their 
review of the medical records, Claimant's history, and their examinations, Drs. Jessen and 
Larson opined that Claimant was medically stable, and that additional medical care would not be 
reasonably expected to provide significant relief of Claimant's residual symptoms. They 
determined that Claimant's condition was due wholly to the 1999 industrial injury, despite the 
presence of preexisting and concurrent degenerative conditions. They rated Claimant as DRE 
Category 3 of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Fifth Ed. (AMA 
Guides, 5th Ed.) with 15% whole person impairment. Drs. Jessen and Larson opined that 
Claimant did have permanent restrictions because of his injury, but that he was capable oflight 
to medium work with a lifting restriction of not more than 25 to 30 pounds on a regular basis. 
25. Dr. McDonald received a copy of the IME report, and in August advised Surety 
that there was still no evidence that Claimant had a complete fusion at C6-7. He recommended 
that Claimant continue to receive physical therapy, anti-inflammatory medication and muscle 
relaxants until a solid fusion could be confirmed. Drs. Jessen and Larson disagreed with 
Dr. McDonald's recommendation for additional physical therapy, noting that Dr. McDonald had 
not actually examined Claimant, and their examination showed no palpable spasm or 
hypertonicity that could be helped with physical therapy. They agreed that use of OTC anti-
inflammatories was appropriate. On September 7, Dr. McDonald wrote Surety advising that 
Claimant's C6-7 fusion remained in question. Further, he believed that the lifting restriction 
given by Drs. Jessen and Larson was overly aggressive, and that he believed Claimant should 
lift no more than 20 to 25 pounds on a frequent basis. Dr. McDonald agreed with the 15% 
whole person impairment awarded by the IME panel. 
26. Claimant developed a pseudarthrosis at C6-7, and Dr. McDonald recommended a 
second surgery. A cardiac arrhythmia was detected, and before Claimant could undergo the 
surgery, he had a cardiovascular assessment. The cardiac care was a prerequisite to the second 
surgery at C6-7. On July 10, 2003, Dr. McDonald performed a revision of Claimant's prior 
C6-7 fusion. By September, Claimant's left upper extremity pain had improved, but he was 
experiencing pain in the right upper extremity. His neck pain was still present, and not 
improving. Of greater concern to Dr. McDonald was that Claimant had developed a drooping 
right eyelid and smaller pupil on the right side. Dr. McDonald diagnosed Homer's syndrome 
with ptosis and melosia. Dr. McDonald ordered an MRI of Claimant's neck to rule out an 
anatomic or pathological basis for the Homer's syndrome. The MRI was negative. 
27. Claimant returned to Dr. McDonald for follow up in November 2003. Claimant 
reported posterior neck pain, and an occasional. sensation similar to an electric shock at the base 
of his neck with certain moveinents. His right upper extremity complaints continued. In March 
2004, Claimant reported the persistence of the same symptoms he reported in November, 
including pain at the base of his neck, the occasional electrical shock-like pain when he moved 
his head, constant numbness through his right shoulder and occasional numbness of the left 
hand. Dr. McDonald noted that Claimant's C6-7 fusion was still incomplete .. 
28. Claimant returned for a one-year follow-up on July 23, 2004. He was not doing 
well, reporting increased neck pain radiating bilaterally into his arms. He still reported the jolt 
of pain like an electrical charge with some movements. Dr. McDonald diagnosed another failed 
fusion at C6-7. The only treatment Dr. McDonald could offer was another revision of the C6-7 
fusion with a posterior stabilization. Dr. McDonald noted that Claimant was scheduled for an 
IME in the near future and thought it appropriate that he have the !ME, as he was stable unless 
he chose to try another surgery. 
29. Dr. Jessen and William R. Pace, III, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, conducted an 
IME of Claimant on August 12, 2004. At the time of the IME, Claimant's complaints that 
related to the 1999 cervical injury included: 1) a constant toothache-like pain in the vicinity of 
the C7 spinous process; 2) intermittent sharp stabbing pain when turning head; 3) upper 
extremities falling asleep or becoming paralyzed ifleft in one position too long; and 4) 
headaches that spread from the occipital region to the frontal region, occurring two or three 
times a week. Following a review of the medical records, taking a patient history, and 
performing exams, the panel opined that: 
• Claimant's cervically related complaints were theresult of the 1999 injury; 
· • The only remaining appropriate treatment for Claimant would be a posterior stabilization 
of the cervical spine at C6-7; 
• Claimant was not stable since an additional surgery was planned. Medical stability 
would not be expected for at least a year following the surgery; 
• Claimant was "essentially unemployable" at the time of the IME based on imaging 
studies and clinical physical findings; and 
• Claimant might benefit from some assistance with regard to his anger and depression. 
30. Claimant chose to try a third fusion at C6-7 and Dr. McDonald opted to do both 
an anterior and a posterior approach. The scheduling of the surgery was delayed by the need for 
cardiac clearance. Dr. McDonald ultimately performed both the anterior and posterior fusion· 
and fixation on February 23, 2005. Claimant was seen eight days after his surgery and was in 
extreme discomfort from posterior cervical muscle spasm. Dr. McDonald counseled Claimant 
regarding use of his medications and prescribed some physical therapy to alleviate the muscle 
spasm. The muscle spasm was much improved on a follow-up visit several days later. By 
August 2005, Claimant admitted to clear improvement in his condition after the surgery, but was 
still experiencing interscapular pain and stinging and some numbness and tingling in his upper 
extremities, bilaterally. Dr. McDonald determined Claimant was medically stable as of 
October 31, 2005, but did not release him to return to work at that time. 
31. Dr. Vincent conducted an IME of Claimant on January 6, 2006, at Surety's 
request. Claimant advised Dr. Vincent that his condition had worsened since the severe spasms 
he experienced immediately after the surgery. Complaints included a stabbing and aching 
headache, stabbing and burning pain in the posterior neck, aching over the shoulders and 
numbness and tingling in the upper extremities bilaterally. Claimant described his pain as 
constant and intense. Following a review of the medical records, taking a history, and 
performing an examination, Dr. Vincent opined that Claimant's cervical complaints flowing 
from the several failed fusions were the result of his 1999 injury. Dr. Vincent was very 
concerned and recommended immediate follow-up for the Homer's syndrome because it could 
indicate.a tumor or aneurism. Dr. Vincent noted that Claimant still had at least one more 
appointment with Dr. McDonald and so had not reached medical stability. He also thought that 
a pain clinic to help Claimant manage his chronic pain syndrome would be helpful. Given that 
he did not find Claimant fixed and stable, Dr. Vincent did not rate Claimant's impairment or 
impose restrictions. 
32. Claimant returned to Dr. McDonald for his one-year follow up on February 17, 
2006. Prior to that visit, Dr. McDonald had an opportunity to review Dr. Vincent's IME report. 
Dr. McDonald found Claimant's medical condition essentially unchanged from his August 2005 
visit. Plain films indicated that Claimant might finally have achieved a fusion at C6-7. 
Dr. McDonald requested a noncontrast CT scan to definitively assess the fusion. The doctor 
asserted, once again, that Claimant was as fixed and stable as he was ever going to be. 
Dr. McDonald discussed Dr. Vincent's recommendation that Claimant participate in a pain 
management program, and Claimant responded with alacrity that he would do no such thing. 
Dr. McDonald disagreed with Dr. Vincent regarding Claimant's vision problems, and remained 
convinced that Claimant's Homer's syndrome was the direct result of the multiple cervical 
surgeries. Further, if Claimant did have ophthalmoplegia, it could not be related to his industrial 
injury. Dr. McDonald did refer Claimant for a neurological/ophthalmologic evaluation, 
however. 
33. Dr. McDonald's February 17 chart note and the subsequent CT scan were 
provided to Dr. Vincent for review. By letter dated April ! 2, 2006, Dr. Vincent agreed that if 
Claimant was not interested in pursuing pain management, there was no further curative 
treatment to offer and he was, indeed, fixed and stable. Dr. Vincent opined that Claimant's 
impairment rating would remain unchanged at 15% of the whole person. Finally, Dr. Vincent 
opined that Claimant was capable of medium work, and should avoid work that required 
maintaining his head in a reading position for long periods, and should be able to move around 
and change positions freely. He also noted that Claimant would have some limitations for 
working overhead due to his loss of range of motion. Dr. McDonald agreed with Dr. Vincent's 
conclusions, except the conclusion that Claimant was capable of medium work. It was 
Dr. McDonald's opinion that Claimant would be limited to light or sedentary work "due to the 
acknowledged level of pain." Defendants' Ex. 2, p. 4. 
34. Surety wrote Dr. Vincent seeking clarification as to whether Claimant's 
limitations and restrictions prior to his 1999 injury were any different from the restrictions as 
outlined in Dr. Vincent's April 2006 addendum to his IME report. Dr. Vincent replied that 
although Claimant had problems with pain following the 1990 surgery, Claimant did ultimately 
return to his time-of-injury work as a heavy equipment operator. Dr. Vincent opined that 
Claimant was capable of performing "at least light work activities." Defendants' Ex. 3, p. 99. 
Dr. Vincent went on to state: 
There are other problems, however, that may prevent him from exceeding light 
work activities. The first would be the fact that he does have some symptom 
embellishment. There is also deconditioning present, and he also has an 
underlying neurological condition. None of these are related to the injury of 
record. 
Were it not for these conditions, however, he would be capable of medium work 
at the current time. 
Id., at pp. 99-100. 
35. Claimant sought assistance from the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division 
(ICRD) on several occasions. ICRD was unable to provide much in the way of meaningful 
vocational assistance because Claimant had not been released to work. 
36. Claimant hired Tom Moreland, a vocational and rehabilitation consultant, to 
review Claimant's employability in light of his work history and his injuries. Mr. Moreland did 
not prepare a written report but did testify at hearing. Mr. Moreland reviewed Claimant's 
extensive medical history, met with him, and obtained information concerning Claimant's work 
history, educational background, daily activities and perceptions of his physical impairments. 
Mr. Moreland also communicated with Dr. McDonald by mail seeking clarification regarding 
Claimant's physical limitations. 
37. In a June 14, 2006 letter to Dr. McDonald, Mr. Moreland wrote: 
In my review of the medical records, it appears as though you strongly disagreed 
with Dr. [Vincent's] assessment that the client could perform medium work. In 
speaking with counsel, and [Claimant], it appears as though you felt he could 
perform sedentary work. Sedentary work as defined by the U.S. Department of 
Labor is defined as follows: 
"SEDENTARY WORK: Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 
pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, 
ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which 
involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in 
carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required 
occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met." 
Additionally, [Claimant] tells me that he, on a normal day, requires a certain 
amount of"down time." Meaning that he needs to take rest periods where he 
needs to lie down completely for upwards to [sic] 30 minutes at a time. These 
breaks take place at intermittent and unpredictable times when the pain is 
overwhelming, according to [Claimant]. It would be very important to know if 
there is a medical basis. He also complains of headaches, which require him to be 
in a dark room for a period of time. 
Do you agree that he is capable of performing sedentary work, and his complaints 
as indicated above would be appropriate? 
Claimant's Ex. I, p. I. The letter then provides an opportunity for Dr. McDonald to mark either 
"YES" or "NO," and sign and date his response. Dr. McDonald checked "YES," and signed the 
letter on June 19, 2006. 
38. Mr. Moreland testified that based on a sedentary work capacity and Claimant's 
need to rest at intermittent and unpredictable times, and his need to retreat to a darkened room 
for his headaches, there was no work that Claimant could perform on a continuous or sustained 
basis. 
39. In his hearing testimony, Mr. Moreland also took issue with a number of jobs that 
had been identified as suitable by Surety's vocational consultant and approved by Dr. Vincent, 
including: dietary aide, auto sales lot attendant, janitor, fast food grill team member, hotel desk 
clerk, and surface mount solderer. Mr. Moreland had concerns about the suitability of these 
positions because many of them were classified as light or medium work capacity. 
Mr. Moreland acknowledged that individual jobs within the general category might require more 
or less physical exertion, but without knowing whether these positions were for particular jobs, 
it seemed likely that they exceeded Claimant's physical capacity. Other positions identified by 
Surety's vocational specialist and approved by Dr. Vincent were either semi-skilled or required 
customer service skills, neither of which were a good fit for Claimant. Mr. Moreland admitted 
that if Dr. Vincent's restrictions were used, there were jobs regularly available that were within 
Claimant's physical ability and skill set. 
40. Surety retained Douglas N. Crum, CDMS, to prepare a disability assessment of 
Claimant -- essentially a quantification of Claimant's pre-injury and post-injury employment 
options. Mr. Crum reviewed Claimant's medical records, the records ofICRD, Claimant's 
deposition, and spoke with Employer. Mr. Crum attempted to meet with and interview 
Claimant, but was denied access. Mr. Crum prepared a lengthy written report, dated October 16, 
2006, and was deposed post-hearing. 
41. Mr. Crum conducted an extensive review of Claimant's medical history, which 
will not be repeated here. Mr. Crum found Claimant's work history more problematic, as his 
deposition testimony regarding his employment history is significantly at odds with his social 
security earnings record-- the only verifiable evidence of Claimant's employment history. 
Mr. Crum also noted that Claimant's job application for Employer was not consistent with his 
work history as provided in his deposition testimony. 
42. Mr. Crum determined that, until he went to work for Employer in the summer of 
1999, Claimant had not really worked since his 1989 industrial injury, earning only $1,722 in 
that ten-year period before he went to work with Employer. Based on Claimant's work history 
and his medical history during this period, Mr. Crum determined that Claimant was employable 
only in light or sedentary occupations in the years leading up to his work with Employer. Mr. 
Crum opined that Claimant's eighteen weeks of work for Employer did not demonstrate that 
Claimant was capable of working beyond the light-to-sedentary range, and in fact, proved that 
he could not. 
43. Mr. Crum concluded that, based upon the restrictions provided by both 
Drs. McDonald and Vincent, Claimant could return to work in light or sedentary work -- the 
same level of physical exertion he was capable of following his first cervical surgery in 1990. 
Because Claimant sustained no reduction in his ability to engage in gainful work as a result of 
the 1999 accident, Mr. Crum determined that Claimant had sustained no disability in excess of 
his impairment as a result of that accident. 
44. Surety received the first notice of Claimant's injury on January 20, 2000. The 
notice of injury listed the date of injury as December 30, 1999, and alleged a shoulder injury. A 
letter from Employer outlining its concerns with the validity of the claim accompanied the 
notice of injury. Employer's concerns included inconsistencies regarding the body part that was 
injured and the date that it occurred. Claimant's version of events was substantially at variance 
from that of his co-workers. Further, Claimant had not returned to work, and was calling 
frequently telling Employer that he could not return to work because of his injury, while the 
medical provider was stating that there was no reason Claimant could not work. 
45. Surety immediately turned the claim over to one of its investigators. The 
investigator spoke with Claimant, Bill Steinpreis, Employer's shop supervisor, John Davis, 
Employer's mechanic, and Lea and Jim Rigby, co-owner and superintendent respectively. The 
investigation report was forwarded to the attorney for Surety in mid-February. 
46. Surety denied the claim on March 7, 2000, based on inconsistencies between and 
among the statements of Claimant, witnesses, and Employer, questions as to the date of injury, 
and concern regarding the role played by Claimant's preexisting conditions. Despite the denial, 
Surety forwarded the claim to its in-house physician for review of the request for surgery that 
was pending at the time the claim was denied. Dr. Swartley recommended that the fusion be 
authorized. 
4 7. Counsel for Claimant contacted Surety in late March, advising Surety that he was 
representing Claimant, and asking Surety to reconsider its denial. Surety replied in mid-April 
that it was standing on its earlier denial, citing to Claimant's failure to provide complete medical 
information. Surety advised that once it received releases for all of Claimant's prior medical 
providers, it would re-examine the denial. 
48. Surety reversed its position and accepted the claim in early May. Surety 
immediately paid Claimant's past time-loss benefits (TTDs) and the costs of the medical care 
Claimant had received. Dr. Swartley once again reviewed Claimant's medical records and 
recommended that in light of Claimant's previous fusion and the invasive nature of the proposed 
surgery, Surety should refer Claimant for a panel evaluation. Drs. Jessen and Linder conducted 
the panel exam, expressed strong reservations about proceeding with the surgery, determined 
Claimant was medically stable, and gave him an impairment rating. 
49. Based on the panel report, Surety ceased paying Claimant TTD benefits, and 
began paying out his impairment benefits (PPI). Surety paid PPI benefits until March 21, 2001, 
when-it authorized the surgery recommended by Dr. McDonald. Surety properly recast the PPI 
benefits that it had been paying as TTDs, and continued paying TTDs until Surety learned that 
Claimant had not had the surgery. TTDs were restarted on August 15, when Claimant was 
scheduled for surgery. In fact, the surgery did not occur until August 22. Surety continued to 
pay TTD benefits until June 20, 2002, when Claimant was found to be medically stable by the 
second panel of physicians, consisting of Drs. Jessen and Larson. As soon as Surety received 
the panel report, it ceased paying TTD benefits and began paying out PPI benefits. 
50. Claimant continued to receive PPI benefits until July 9, 2003, when he had a 
second cervical surgery. Thereafter, Surety paid TTD benefits until November 7, 2005, the date 
that Surety received notice from Dr. McDonald that Claimant was medically stable from his last 
surgery. At that time, Surety voluntarily paid an additional 5% PPI pending a panel evaluation 
and a determination whether Claimant sustained additional impairment as a result of the last 
surgery. 
51. Ultimately, Dr. Vincent and Dr. McDonald agreed that Claimant's impairment 
did not increase as a result of the third cervical surgery, and remained at 15% of the whole 
person. In total, Surety paid PPI benefits based on 20% whole person impairment, thus over-
paying PPI benefits by approximately $5,500. By April 30, 2006, Claimant had received 
payment for all PPI benefits to which he was entitled, and an additional 5%, and Surety stopped 
paying benefits. 
52. In June 2003, following his first cervical surgery related to the 1999 accident, 
Drs. Jessen and Larson rated Claimant's impairment from the 1999 accident at 15% whole 
person. Claimant was not rated following his second surgery because he was never medically 
stable. In the spring of 2006, Dr. Vincent determined that Claimant was medically stable and 
that his total permanent impairment arising from the 1999 accident remained at 15% whole 
person. In a note dated May 1, 2006, Dr. McDonald agreed with Dr. Vincent's impairment 
rating. Dr. McDonald later expressed a contrary opinion in an October 2, 2006 letter to 
Claimant. 
53. The 15% whole person impairment awarded by Ors. Jessen, Larson, and Vincent 
is consistent with DRE Category III impairment as set out in the AMA Guides, 5th Ed. 
Dr. McDonald initially agreed with this rating, and although he later reconsidered, he provided 
no rating and no analysis of how he would have determined a rating. Claimant sustained a 15% 
whole person impairment of his cervical spine as a result of his 1999 industrial accident, which 
amount has been paid in full by Surety. 
54. Claimant now has Homer's syndrome which involves drooping in his right eyelid 
and a smaller pupil in that eye. Dr. McDonald attributes the Homer's syndrome to the three 
cervical surgeries he performed. According to Dick L. Vester, 0.D., the optometrist who 
examined Claimant, there was no loss of visual acuity as a result of the Homer's Syndrome. 
Claimant did, according to Dr. Vester, sustain some loss of visual field as a result of the 
syndrome, which Dr. Vester rated in conformity with the AMA Guides, 5th Ed., determining 
that Claimant had 37% whole person impairment as a result of the loss of visual field. However, 
total loss of vision in one eye is a statutory benefit pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-428, and is only 
rated at 150 weeks, or 30% whole person. Claimant's loss of some visual field in one eye must 
necessarily result in impairment significantly less than the total loss of vision in one eye. The 
Referee finds that Claimant is entitled to 5% whole person impairment for his loss of field of 
vision in his right eye resulting from his Homer's Syndrome. Surety overpaid Claimant's PPI 
for his cervical injuries by 5%. The combined value of the two impairments is 19%. Claimant 
has already been paid impairment of 20%, so Claimant has been fully compensated, in fact 
overcompensated, for his permanent impairment stemming from his 1999 accident. 
R., pp. 44-65. 
55. The Commission addressed the issue of permanent impairment, noting, 
"Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional abnormality or functional 
abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation ahs been achieved and 
which abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or non-progressive at 
the time of the evaluation. Idaho Code§ 72-422. "Evaluation (rating of 
permanent impairment" is a medical appraisal of the nature and extent of the 
injury or disease as it affects an injured worker's personal efficiency in the 
activities of daily living, such as self-care, communication, normal living 
postures, ambulation, elevation, traveling, and non-specialized activities of 
bodily members. Idaho Code § 72-424. When determining impairment, the 
opinions of physicians are advisory only. The Commission is the ultimate 
evaluator of impainnent. Urry v. Walker Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 
750, 755, 769 P.2d l 122, l 127 (1989). 
56. As to the cervical injury, the Commission found Claimant sustained a 15% whole 
. person impainnent as a result of the 1999 industrial accident which had been fully paid by the 
Surety based upon the opinions of Drs. Jessen, Larson and Vincent with a concurrence by 
Dr. McDonald in a note dated May 1, 2006, and that that rating is consistent with the DRE 
Category III impairment as set out in the AMA Guides, 5th Edition. 
57. The Commission found Claimant is entitled to 5% whole person impairment for 
loss of field of vision in his right eye resulting from Homer's Syndrome, noting that the 
impairment rating given by Dick L. Vester, O.D., an optometrist, for loss of visual acuity in one 
eye was greater than loss of total vision in one eye pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-428. The 
combined value of the cervical impairment of 15% whole person and the 5% for the Homer's 
syndrome is 19%. The Commission noted that Claimant is already been paid impairment of 
20% so Claimant had been fully compensated, in fact, overcompensated for his permanent 
impairment from the 1999 accident. 
58. As to disability, the Commission summarized the law, stating, 
The definition of"disability" under the Idaho workers' compensation law is: 
... a decrease in wage-earning capacity due to injury or occupational 
disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of physical 
impairment, and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in 
section 72-430, Idaho Code. 
Idaho Code § 72-102 (I 0). A permanent disability results: 
when the actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is 
reduced or absent because of permanent impairment and no fundamental 
or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. 
Idaho Code§ 72-423. A rating of permanent disability is an appraisal of the 
injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful 
activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by 
pertinent nonmedical fact ors. Idaho Code§ 72-425. Among the pertinent 
nonmedical factors are the following: the nature of the physical disablement; the 
cumulative effect of multiple injuries; the employee's occupation; the employee's 
age at the time of the accident; the employee's diminished ability to compete in 
the labor.market within a reasonable geographic area; all the personal and 
economic circumstances of the employee; and other factors deemed relevant by 
the commission. Idaho Code § 72-430. 
59. As to total permanent disability, the Commission summarized the law stating, 
A Claimant may establish that he is totally and permanently disabled in 
one of two ways. 
First, a claimant may prove a total and permanent disability if his or her 
medical impairment together with the nonmedical factors total l 00%. If 
the Commission finds that a claimant has met his or her burden of proving 
100% disability via the claimant's medical impairment and pertinent 
nonmedical factors, there is no need for the Commission to continue. The 
total and permanent disability has been established at that stage. See 
Hegel v. Kuhlman Bros., Inc., 115 Idaho 855,857, 771 P.2d 519,521 
(1989) (Bakes, J., specially concurring) ("Once 100% disability is found 
by the Commission on the merits of a claimant's case, claimant has proved 
his entitlement to I 00% disability benefits, and there is no need to employ 
the burden-shifting odd lot doctrine"). 
Boley v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 278, 28 l, 939 P.2d 854, 
857 (1997). 
When a claimant cannot make the showing required for I 00% disability, then a 
second methodology is available: 
The odd-lot category is for those workers who are so injured that they can 
perfom1 no services other than those that are so limited in quality, 
dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does 
not exist. 
Jarvis v. Rexburg Nursing Center, 136 Idaho 579; 584 38 P.3d 617,622 (2001) 
citing Lyons v. Industrial Special Indem. Fund, 98 Idaho 403,565 P.2d 1360 
( 1977). The worker need not be physically unable to perform any work: 
They are simply not regularly employable in any wellaknown branch of 
the labor market absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their 
part. 
Id. 136 Idaho at 584, 38 P.3d at 622. Although the issue as stated at the outset of 
this proceeding was couched in terms of the first methodology, Claimant actually 
argued in his briefing that he was totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot 
worker. 
60. An employee may prove total disability under the odd lot worker doctrine in one 
of three ways: (1) by showing that he has attempted other types of employment without success; 
(2) by showing that he or vocational counselors or employment agencies on his behalf have 
searched for other work and other work is not available; or, (3) by showing that any efforts to 
find suitable employment would be futile. Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging~ Const., 127 Idaho 
221, 224, 899 P.2d 434, 437 (1995). Claimant has failed to make a primafacie case that he is an 
odd-lot worker. 
61. The Claimant had not worked since the 1999 injury. In fact, Claimant made no 
meaningful attempts to find work sine his 1999 industrial injury. Claimant's several fleeting 
contacts with ICRD staff were undertaken only to provide an appearance that he was interested 
in returning to work. He made it perfectly clear to ICRD staff, and to his doctors, that he did not 
believe he could work. Neither Mr. Crum nor Mr. Moreland were retained to assist Claimant in 
actually finding a job. 
62. Claimant's odd-lot argument would hence be based upon the futility requirement 
that it would be futile for him to even look for work. In discussing the testimony, the 
Commission concluded that Mr. Moreland, Claimant's expert, was not persuasive. The problem 
with the limitations used and premised upon by Mr. Moreland is that they were largely 
concocted by him, not the physicians involved in Claimant's case. 
Dr. McDonald deferred to an IME panel for Claimant's final impairment rating and work 
restrictions. Dr. Vincent did the rating and imposed the following restrictions: 
J;> Claimant was capable of medium work; 
J;> Claimant should avoid work that required maintaining his head in a 
reading position for long periods of time; 
J;> Claimant would have difficulty with over-head work; and 
J;> Claimant needed to move around and change positions freely. 
Dr. McDonald agreed with everything in Dr. Vincent's evaluation except Claimant's 
physical work capacity, which he rated to be light to sedentary. R., pp. 64-68. 
63. The Commission concluded Claimant failed to carry his burden of proving that . 
he is totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot worker. It stated, "Claimant has not sought 
work, has not enlisted the aid of others to look for work on his behalf, and there is no persuasive 
evidence that it would be futile for Claimant to even look for work." R., p. 69. 
64. As to the issue of disability in excess of impairment, the Commission correctly 
noted that whether Claimant has sustained disability in excess of impairment turns upon 
Claimant's ability to work before the 1999 accident is comparedwith his ability to work after 
the accident. 
65. Claimant averred he was performing heavy work at the time of his 1999 injury 
and that is proof enough that he was capable of performing heavy work before his injury. 
Relying on Dr. McDonald's check mark, Claimant asserts he is now limited to sedentary work, 
thus, as stated in his brief: "One thing is clear, if [Claimant] is not totally and permanently 
disabled, he has substantial disability in excess of his impairment." Claimant's Post-Hearing 
Memorandum, p. 9. R., p. 70. 
66. On the other hand, Mr. Crum opined that claimant's lack of work history in the 
ten years leading to the 1999 accident, together with the short period of time he worked for 
Employer before his injury, is proof that Claimant could not perform the heavy labor that had 
been his primary occupation, if not the source of his income. Based on the records he reviewed, 
including Claimant's work history, his medical records, and the proceedings from his 
Washington workers' compensation case, together with Claimant's own testimony, Mr. Crum 
opined that prior to the 1999 injury, Claimant was functioning in a light or sedentary capacity. 
R.,p. 70. 
67. Claimant's work capacity following his 1999 injury is also disputed. Dr. Vincent 
initially determined that Claimant could perform medium work. Dr. McDonald disagreed and 
thought Claimant could perform light-to-sedentary work. Dr. Vincent later clarified that 
Claimant might not be able to perform medium work, but it was because of other problems not 
related to the industrial injury. He believed that but for those other issues, Claimant was capable 
of medium work. Taking thos~ other issues'into account, Claimant could perform "at least light 
work activities." Def. Ex. 3, p. 99. R., p. 71. 
68. Each theory as to Claimant's work capacity prior to his 1999 injury has some 
merit, but at the end of the day, each is speculation. As to Claimant's work capacity following 
his 1999 injury, the weight of authority supports a finding that Claimant could work at either 
light or sedentary occupations, as both Drs. McDonald and Vincent find common ground there, 
along with Mr. Crum. R., p. 71. 
69. The burden of proof is on the claimantto prove disability in excess of 
impairment. Expert testimony is not required to prove disability. The test is not whether the 
claimant is able to work at some employment, but whether a physical impairment, together with 
nonmedical factors, has reduce the claimant's capacity for gainful activity. Seese v. Ideal of 
Idaho, 110 Idaho 32, 714 P.2d 1 (1986). 
Claimant has failed to carry his burden of proving disability in excess of his impairment. 
Claimant offered no substantial competent evidence to support his assertion that he was capable 
of heavy or medium work on a sustained basis before his 1999 injury. Absent proof that he 
could perform at a medium or heavy level for a sustained period, Claimant cannot establish that 
his capacity for gainful activity has diminished in any appreciable way as a result of the 1999 
industrial accident. R., pp.71-72. 
II. 
RESTATED ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Commission's conclusion that Claimant is entitled to Whole person 
impairment of 19% for his injuries arising from the 1999 industrial accident is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
2. Whether the Commission's conclusion that Claimant has not sustained any 
disability in excess of 19% impairment as a result of his I 999 industrial accident is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
3. Whether Claimant can argue on appeal whether or not the Commission abused its 
discretion by not retaining jurisdiction when the issue was never before raised. 
4. Whether the Commission's conclusion that Claimant is not entitled to attorney's 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 is based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
III. 
WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents claim entitlement to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 11. l, which 
directs the Court to award expenses, including attorney fees, incurred because of an appeal not 
reasonably grounded in fact or law and filed for an improper purpose. Shriner v. Rausch, 141 
Idaho 228,232, 108 P.3d 375,379 (2005). Attorney fees are awardable under I.AR. Rule 11. l 
when a party requesting them proves(!) the other party's arguments are not well-grounded in 
fact, warranted by existing law, or made in good faith, and (2) the claims for an improper 
purpose,· such as unnecessary delay or increase in the cost of litigation. Frank v. Bunker Hill 
Co., 142 Idaho 126, 132, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005) . 
• 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court may set aside an order or award by the Commission if: (1) the commission's 
findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence; (2) the commission has 
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the findings of fact, order or award were 
procured by fraud; or ( 4) the findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or 
award. I.C. §72-732; Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 345-46, 63 P.3d 469, 471-72 (2003). 
The Court exercises free review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not disturb 
factual findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 
346, 63 P.3d at 472. 
When hearing an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission, this Court 
must view the facts and all inferences therefore most favorably to the party who prevailed before 
the Commission. Garcia v. JR. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 969, 772 P.2d 173 (1989). When 
this Court reviews the Commission's factual findings, we must affirm if' those findings are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Mapusaqa v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 113 
Idaho 842, 748 P.2d 1372 (1987). 
In addition, it is within the Commission's province to decide what weight should be 
given to the facts presented and conclusions drawn from those facts. The Commission's 
conclusions on the weight and credibility of the evidence should not be disturbed on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 
1178, 1180 (1999). 
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. It is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE COMMISSION FINDING THAT CLAIMANT HAS SUSTAINED A 19% 
PERMANENT PARTlAL IMPAIRMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Claimant readily admits that determination of physical impairment is a question of fact 
for the Commission. What Claimant is arguing are weight and credibility issues between various 
opinions in the record below. Claimant again on appeal is attempting to attack the credibility of 
Ronald L. Vincent, M.D. Dr. Vincent, a board certified neurosurgeon, licensed in the State of 
Washington, has practiced there since 1971. Depo. ofRonald L. Vincent, M.D., Exhibit I. He 
has been board certified since November 1973 in neurological surgery. Id., p. 6, II. 7-12. 
Dr. Vincent was familiar with Claimant as he had performed an intercervical diskectomy at the 
C5-6 level in 1990 on Claimant. Id., at 7, IL 9-17. Claimant was given a Category II impairment 
for that procedure. Id., at 7, 11-18-25. On April 12, 2006, Dr. Vincent wrote a report stating 
that Claimant's impairment for the December 30, 1999, injury was 15% whole person 
impairment based upon the AMA Guides to Evaluation of Impairment, 5th Edition. Id., Ex. 2 at 
00103. Dr. Vincent clarified his opinion in his correspondence of June 27, 2006, to Jeanne 
Kelsch, Senior Claims Examiner, Idaho State Insurance Fund, writing, 
At this time, he is capable of performing at least light activities. There are other 
problems, however, that may prevent him from exceeding light work activities. 
The first would be the fact that he does have some symptom embellishment. 
There is also the condition present, and he also has an underlying neurological 
condition. None of these are related to the injury of record. 
(Emphasis supplied.) Id., at Ex. 2, p. 00099. Dr. Vincent testified that Claimant has chronic 
pain and had it before and after his surgery in 1990 and Dr. Vincent considered it still a part of 
his condition. Depo. of Ronald L. Vincent, M.D., p. 22, II. 1-15. Jeffrey McDonald, M.D., 
agreed with the impairment rating and recommendations and conclusions of Dr. Vincent. Def. 
Ex. 2, at 00004. 
The court has consistently stated it does not scrutinize the weight and credibility of 
evidence relied on by the Commission and will not disturb any findings regarding weight and 
credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. Soto v. J.R. Simplot, 126 Idaho 535,539, 87 P.2d 
1043, 1046 (1994); Page v. McKean Foods, Inc., 2008 Opinion No. 19 (January 31, 2008). A 
physician's opinion is advisory to the Industrial Commission, which is the ultimate fact-finder, 
and will determine the extent of impairment based on all of the evidence obtained and other 
pertinent factors. Urry v. Walker and Fox Masonry Contractors, I 15 Idaho 750, 756, 769 P.2d 
1122, 1128 (1989). The Commission determined that Claimant had sustained a 15% whole 
person impairment of cervical spine based upon opinions ofDrs. Jessen and Larson, Dr. Vincent, 
and Dr. McDonald's agreement with Dr. Vincent's impairment rating. The finding is supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT CLAIMANT HAS NOT SUSTAINED 
DISABILITY IN EXCESS OF HIS 19% IMPAIRMENT IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Claimant must bear the burden of proof in establishing that he is disabled in excess of 
impairment. Bennett v. Clerk Herford Ranch, 106 Idaho 438, 440, 680 P.2d 539, 54 I (1984). 
The issue before the Court is whether the Commission's determination that Davidson failed to 
carry his burden of proving that he was disabled in excess of the 19% whole person impairment 
is supported by the factual record. McCabe V. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 2007 Opinion No. 142 
(December 27, 2007). 
Under the Idaho worker's compensation law a "disability" is defined as "a decrease in 
wage-earning-capacity due _to injury or occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the 
medical factor of physical impairment, and by pertinent nonmedical factors." LC.§ 72-102(11). 
A claimant's permanent disability rating is determined by appraising the combined effect of 
those medical and nonmedical factors on the "injured employee's present and probable future 
ability to engage in gainful activity." I.C. §72-425. 
As far as the medical factor of disability is concerned, Davidson was assigned a 
permanent physical impairment rating of 19% whole person. See LC.§ 72-422. However, a 
clajmant' s impairment rating is only one, but not the exclusive, element considered in 
determining permanent partial disability. I.C. §§ 72-425, 72-427. A disability rating may 
exceed a claimant's impairment rating after the nonmedical factors are taken into consideration. 
Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc., 103 Idaho 458,461, 649 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1982). 
Idaho Code§ 72-430(1) identifies the essential nonmedical factors: the nature of the 
physical disablement; the cumulative effect of multiple injuries; the occupation of the employee; 
the employee's age at the time of accident; all personal and economic circumstances of the 
employee; and other factors as the Commission may deem relevant. 
This Court has long rejected the assertion that whenever a permanent physical 
impairment rating is given, the disability rating must exceed the impairment rating. Houser v. 
S. Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441,445,649 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1982). Although expert 
testimony on this issue need not be presented, the burden of proof is upon the claimant to 
provide disability in excess of her impairment rating. Bennett, 106 Idaho at 440, 680 P .2d at 
541. 
This Court has previously held that "the test for determining whether a claimant 
has suffered permanent disability greater than medical impairment is not whether 
claimant is able to return to work at some employment. " Bennett, 106 Idaho at 
440, 680 P .2d at 541 ( emphasis added). Rather the correct test is whether, after 
consideration of the pertinent nonmedical factors outlined in Idaho Code 
§ 72-430, the claimant's "probable future ability to engage in gainful activity" is 
accurately reflected by the impairment rating, Houser, I 03 Idaho at 445, 649 
P.2d at 1202; Graybill v. Swift & Co., 115 Idaho 293,294,766 P.2d 763, 764 
(1988). 
The Commission found as a fact that Claimant could work at a light or sedentary 
occupation in accordance with the medical evidence from Drs. McDonald and Vincent and 
expert vocational assessment of Mr. Crum. 
The SIF Fund retained Douglas N. Crum, CDMS, as a vocational expert. Crum is a · 
highly experienced professional in his expertise. Depo. of Douglas N. Crum, Depo. Ex I. Crum 
prepared a 60-page report. Def. Ex. 16; Depo. of Douglas N. Crum; Ex. 2. Crum is of the 
opinion that there is no basis to conclude that Claimant has sustained any reduction in his ability 
to engage in gainful activity and that Claimant has sustained no permanent partial disability in 
excess of his permanent partial impairment rating for the 1999 industrial injury. Def. Ex. 16 at 
01217. In addition, Dr. Vincent approved jobs that are within Claimant's current and preexisting 
capacities. The jobs Dr. Vincent approved are regularly available in good quantities in 
Claimant's labor market. Id. at 01216. 
Doug Crum never met with Claimant. He requested of Mr. Verbillis to meet with 
Claimant several times. He was not permitted. He would have preferred to meet with him but it 
does not affect his opinion. Depo. of Douglas N. Crum, p. 9, 1. 16-p. 10, 1. 2. 
Tom Moreland testified at the hearing. Moreland is a frequent Claimant expert. 
Moreland did not do a written report. He did not speak with Dr. McDonald. He did not ask 
Dr. McDonald if Claimant could do light work. Moreland agreed that Dr. McDonald agreed 
with Dr. Vincent that Claimant was capable of light and sedentary work. Moreland did not do a 
labor market survey. He acknowledged that Claimant has not done any type of job search. 
Moreland did not provide Claimant with assistance regarding a job search. Moreland admitted 
that Claimant is employable ifhe can perform light duty work. Hr. Tr. p. 143, II. 11-15. His 
opinion of the level of Claimant's ability to work is based, in part, upon Claimant's self-
described limitations and conditions. Id. at II. 16-20. The problem with Moreland's analysis is 
that he has ignored Dr. McDonald's approval oflight duty work entirely. Instead, he focused on 
a sedentary work limitation with Claimant's self-imposed and perceived restrictions. Vocational 
opinions not based upon actual medical restrictions are neither objective nor credible. Finally, 
Moreland was unfamiliar with Claimant's preexisting history and conditions to the extent 
necessary. He admitted that he looked at some of the Washington L&I file from 1988 and 
scanned a portion of it. This, of course, contains a multitude of facts regarding a number of 
vocationally related issues. Moreland's testimony was not persuasive. 
There was a dispute as to Claimant's prior work ability before the 1999 injury. The 
Commission correctly determined that Claimant offered no substantial and competent to support 
his assertion that he is capable of heavy or medium on a sustained basis before the 1999 injury. 
Indeed, the weight of evidence was that Claimant had little earnings from his 1988 injury until 
he went to work for the Employer in a job in which he sat and operated heavy equipment 
vehicles. Claimant's disability focus was on disagreement with limitations preinjury and post-
injury, which is a factual issue. The Commission's decision was based upon the medical factor 
per testimony and .records of Dr. Vincent and Dr. McDonald, and nonmedical factors including 
but not limited to: (1) preexisting limitations; (2) effect of preexisting injuries; (3) Claimant's 
work history; (4) Claimant's earning history per reported income for Social Security 
(Def. Ex. l); (5) Claimant's employment history; (6) Claimant's age; (6) vocational work of 
Douglas Crum (Depo. of Douglas N. Crum); (7) Claimant's return to work attempts; and a 
myriad of other relevant factors. 
C. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION WAS NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND CANNOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Claimant requested pursuant to Rule XII3 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Industrial Commission calendaring on the issues of: (I) whether Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled; (2) apportionment; (3) impairment disability; and (4) attorney's fees. R., 
p. 34. 
Respondents Riverland and SIF filed a response requesting additional issues of 
apportionment be heard. R., p. 36. Respondent/ISIP filed a response requesting certain 
additional issues to be heard, not including retention of jurisdiction. R., p. 39. 
In Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 106 Idaho 895,896, 684 P.2d 297,298 (1984), 
this court stated, 
Idaho's workmen's compensation statutes are designed to provide "sure and 
certain relief for injured workmen and their families ... " I.C. Sec. 72-201 . This 
Court has consistently held that legislative policy requires our statues be 
construed "liberally in favor of the claimant." Miller v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 
105 Idaho 725,672 P.2d 1055 (1983) (82 IWCD 2 at 496); Hattenburg v. Blanks, 
98 Idaho 485,567 P.2d 829 (1977); Miller v. FMC Corp., 93 Idaho 695,471 P.2d 
550 (1970); Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424,380 P.2d 208 (1963). In 
keeping with that legislative intent, it is a prudent practice for the Industrial 
3 J.R.P. Rule 8.C is the applicable rule. It states in part,"!. Unless otherwise scheduled for a hearing under these 
rules, no case shall be set for hearing until the time for filing an answer has passed and a party shall have filed with 
the Commission and served on all other parties a written request for hearing which shall contain the following:· ... 
(b) Clear and concise statement of the factual and legal issue or issues which the party desires the Commission to 
hear and decide." (Emphasis added.) 
Commission to retain jurisdiction in cases where, as here, it is clear that there is a 
probability that medical factors will produce additional physical impairment in 
the future. In essence, we approved of this practice in Brooks v. Duncan, 96 
Idaho 579,583,532 P.2d 921,925 (1975); stating that limitation periods for filing 
claims "do not bear upon the authority of the Commission to retain jurisdiction 
regarding an industrial claim. 
In a situation where the claimant's impairment is progressive and, therefore, 
cannot adequately be determined for purposes of establishing a permanent 
disability rating, it is entirely appropriate for the Industrial Commission to retain 
jurisdiction until such time as the claimant's condition is nonprogressive. 
Reynolds v. Browning Ferris Industries, l 13 Idaho 965, 969, 751 P.2d ll3, 117 
(1988). 
It is important to note that in both Horton and Reynolds Claimant requested retention of 
jurisdiction. This was an issue for consideration by the Commission. Here it was not an issue in 
front of the Commission and cannot be raised on appeal. It is well-established that, in order for 
an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms the basis 
for an assignment of error. Whitted v. Canyon County Board of Com 'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121-22, 
44 P.3d, 1173, 1176-77 (2002). An issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered by the Supreme Court. Cristo Viene Pentecostal v. Paz, 160 P.3d 743, 144 Idaho 304 
(2007). See also, Painter v. Potlatch Corp., 138 Idaho 309, 314, 63 P.3d, 435, 440 (2003). 
Since the issue of retention to jurisdiction was not raised as an issue for consideration by the 
Industrial Commission and there was no adverse ruling, it cannot be considered here. 
Claimant's pain complaints for the claim of July 11, 1988, are well documented as 
continuing through around August of 1997 when that claim was finally closed. Def. Ex. 4. The 
medical evidence in the record for this injury is not in dispute as to the nonprogressive nature of 
Claimant's condition. He was deemed stable by Dr. McDonald, his treating neurosurgeon, after 
the third cervical surgery. Claimant refused further treatment including a pain clinic and trigger 
point injection as recommended by Dr. Vincent and Dr. McDonald. Def. Ex. 2 at 00006. He was 
then found stable without in need of further medi~al treatment by Dr. Vincent. Def. Ex. 3 at 
00103. Likewise, his treating physician, Dr. McDonald, concurred. Def. Ex. 2 at 00004. There 
is simply no evidence that Claimant's impairment is progressive, aild therefore, even if the 
Commission had heard the retention of jurisdiction issue, it would have likely not retained 
jurisdiction. 
D. THE COMMISSION'S FACTUAL FINDINGS REGARDING THE ATTORNEY· 
FEE ISSUE IS BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Idaho Code §72-804 provides for an award ofreasonable attorney's fees when the 
Commission determines that the employer contested a claim for compensation without 
reasonable grounds. The question of whether grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney's 
fees is a question of fact for the Commission; therefore, the Court will uphold the Commission's 
. determination on this issue if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Troutner v. 
Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 525,528,547P.2d1130, 1133 (1976); Wutherich v. 
Tertling Co., Inc., 135 Idaho 593,595, 21 P.3d 915, 917(2001). 
The arguments on the attorney's fees issues at the Commission level were factually 
complicated. On appeal Claimant's argument is limited to the initial denial. Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 16-18. The Commission found that after Claimant's filing of the claim there was confusion 
about the date of the injury, the type of injury, inconsistency in witness testimony, and there was 
a lapse in time from the date of injury to the filing of the claim. These findings support the 
Commission's conclusion that the Employer/Surety actions were reasonable. 
Three time lines regarding processing of this claim set forth the history of acceptance of 
the claim. Depo. of Jeanne Kelsch, Depo. Ex. 3 pp. 11-12; Id. at Depo. Ex. 2, p. 26; Depo. Ex. 3 
pp. 25-29. 
On January 20, 2000, the Surety received notice of injury and a letter dated January 14, 
. 2000, from the Employer requesting that the claim be investigated. Id., Ex. 3 at 25; Id., at 57. 
Lea Rigby with the Employer informed the SIF that Claimant told her on January 3, 
2000, that he was injured on December 30, 1999. She told him to immediately go to the doctor. 
Claimant also indicated that he did not tell her earlier as he had told the mechanics. She spoke 
with the mechanics who indicated that Claimant pulled a muscle in his shoulder on the 23rd of 
November, 1999, but continued to work. He worked part-time due to lack of work through the 
month of December 1999. Ms. Rigby spoke with Mindy at North Idaho Immediate Care, 
Claimant's medical treater, on January 14, 2000, and was informed there was no medical reason 
why Claimant cannot work. Id. 
The Surety initiated investigation on February 3, 2000. On that day Employer told the 
SIF that it has serious doubts that Claimant's injuries were a result of his November 23, 1999, 
accident. On February 4, 2000, the case was assigned to an investigator who contacted the 
Employer, coworkers and Claimant to take statements. At that time there was a discrepancy as 
to what date the incident possibly occurred and what happened. Larry Gardner, investigator, 
prepared an investigative report detailing interviews with Claimant, Bill Steinpreis, shop 
foreman for the Employer, John Davis, mechanic and coworker, and Lea Rigby, coowner of 
Employer, and Jim Rigby, superintendent. Id. pp. 46-52. Issues were raised regarding when the 
alleged accident happened and possible physical injury. On March 13, 2000, Bill Steinpreis, 
Claimant's supervisor, called the SIF stating he could not have been injured on the dates claimed 
because he did not work those days. Id., at 26. About that time the Surety became aware of 
preexisting medical issues and sent a priority request to Washington L&I for records on 
March 13, 2000, and to Sacred Heart. On March 14, 2000, the Surety denied the requested 
surgery as. the claim was denied. On March 20, 2000, the Surety received a letter dated 
March 13, 2000, from the Employer requesting that he return to work as he had a light duty work 
release from North Idaho Immediate Care. Claimant notified the Employer subsequently that he 
is not released per Dr. McDonald. The Employer contacted the Surety on April 4, 2000, 
indicating that Dirk from IC (Industrial Commission) showed her a medical report that indicated 
it (the injury) was not related to the alleged incident. 
On April 13, 2000, the Surety contacted Claimant's attorney stating its standing on the 
original denial of March 7, 2000. The Surety was aware that Claimant sought medical treatment 
for a cervical condition up through and possibly later than 1995. That treatment was not 
reflected in a list of physicians he provided that he had seen. Request was made again for a 
complete list of medical providers Claimant has seen. Claimant was notified that the Surety will 
reevaluate upon receiving the information. Immediately a Complaint was received by the SIF 
and referred the next day to outside counsel. On May 9, 2000, the Surety issued checks for total 
temporary disability to Claimant due from January 5, 2000, to May 9, 2000, started paying 
regular total temporary disability benefits and set up a panel evaluation to address medical issues 
and surgery. Id., Ex. 2 at 26. 
Factual disputes surrounding the acceptance of the claim cannot be said to be 
unreasonable and were not found to be unreasonable by the Commission. The test for when 
attorney's fees are awardable are not judged by hindsight. Gordon v. George R. White Bark 
Processing, 2006 UC 0582, 06 IWCD _ __, (2006) .. The Commission's decisions on the 
attorney's fees issues and specifically the initial denial were based upon competent and 
substantial evidence. 
E. RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AW ARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Respondents request attorney fees on the grounds that Appellant has done nothing more 
than ask the court to re-weigh the evidence. There is substantial competent evidence supporting 
the decisions of the Commission. An award is proper in such a case where the court is again 
asked to re-weigh the evidence and the appeal has done nothing more than to needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation. I.AR. 11.1. In this case Claimant attempts to raise a credibility issue when 
there is no such issue. There is no merit in this argument. It is unjustified by the facts and 
records. Therefore, attorney fees are awardable to the Respondents as these proceedings have 
been instituted in this court and continued without reasonable grounds. See, Rivas v. K.C. 
Logging, 134 Idaho 603, 609, 7 P.3d 212 (2000). 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission findings are based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
Claimant merely asks the Supreme Court to re-weigh the evidence and credibility. The Industrial 
Commission's orders must be affinned. 
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